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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Appellee (the "City") agrees that jurisdiction is properly placed in this 
Court inasmuch as it is an appeal from a final Ruling and Order of the Second District 
Court wherein the trial court ruled that two closed meetings which the Appellant (the 
"Petitioner") challenged as improperly closed to the public. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the City's Planning Commission 
meeting of January 22, 2004 was properly closed to the public. 
The standard of review for this issue allows the Court to review the trial court's 
decision for correctness. Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Salt Lake County Commission, 28 P.3d 
686, 688 (Utah 2001). This issue was preserved for appeal. [R. at 1-2, 40-41, 47-48, 59, 
61-63,68]. 
2. The City objects to the presentation of Petitioner's second issue because it 
was not argued at the trial court level, and because Petitioner has failed to identify any 
portion of the record as required by Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(5)(A). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
State Statutes 
Utah Code §52-4-2 
Utah Code §52-4-3 
Utah Code §52-4-4 
Utah Code §52-4-5(1 )(a)(iii) 
Utah Code §52-4-6 
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Utah Code §52-4-7.5(2)(b)(i) 
Utah Code §52-4-10 
[See Addendum "A"l 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner brought an action entitled "Petition for Judicial Review to Challenge 
the Legality of Closed Meetings" pursuant to Utah Code §52-4-10 arguing that the City's 
Council meeting of October 28, 2003 and the City's Planning Commission meeting of 
January 22, 2004 were improperly closed to the public. [R. 1-6]. The Petitioner has 
abandoned his challenge to the October 28, 2003 City Council meeting. [Petitioner's 
Brief at pg. 1]. The City then filed a response to the Petitioner's Petition for Judicial 
Review arguing that the allegations made by Petitioner were largely irrelevant and that 
the challenged meetings were properly closed to the public pursuant to Utah Code §52-4-
5(l)(a)(iii). [R. at 65-69]. The Petitioner filed a Response to the City's Answer 
Regarding Petition to Challenge the Legality of Closed Meetings. [R. at 7-29]. 
Petitioner then filed a Motion to Supplement and Request for Summary Judgment. [R. 
35-38], The City filed a memorandum opposing the Petitioner's Motion to Supplement 
and Request for Summary Judgment and in support of the City's Motion to Strike 
Petitioner's Motion to Supplement and Request for Summary Judgment. [R. at 39-41]. 
Petitioner failed to timely respond to the City's motion, and the City submitted the 
motion for decision. [R. at 45-46]. Then, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §52-4-10, 
the City submitted to the trial court the minutes of the closed meetings, [R. at 47-49], and 
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the Petitioner moved to strike portions of said submission [R. 50-52].l The City opposed 
that motion, [R. at 58-60], but the motion was never submitted to the Court for decision. 
The trial court then issued its Ruling and Order denying Petitioner's petition to challenge 
the propriety of the closed meetings. [R. at 61-64]. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Notice for the Planning Commission's closed meeting of January 22, 2004 
was posted and properly distributed on January 20, 2004. [R. at 49, document entitled 
"South Weber City's Planning Commission Amended Agenda;" See Pg. 2, Addendum D 
of Petitioner's Brief]. 
1
 Upon reviewing the trial court's record submitted to this Court, the City notes that 
copies of the minutes of the closed meeting were submitted as part of the record. As 
demonstrated by the record itself, these minutes were submitted to the trial court for an en 
camera review pursuant to U.C.A. §52-4-10. [R. at 47]. In that submission, the City 
informed the trial court that the minutes were protected documents until further order of 
the court and that they were being provided in a sealed envelope for an en camera 
review. [R. at 48]. Moreover, the City instructed that if the trial court agreed that the 
minutes, or certain portions thereof, were the result of properly closed meetings, that no 
copies of the minutes should be made, that the minutes should be sealed, and that the 
originals should be returned to the City. [R. at 48]. As evidenced by the record, this 
clearly was not done, but the City trusts that the Petitioner did not review the contents of 
Recond No. 49 inasmuch as they were designated as "Confidential Documents." [R. at 
49]. The City respectfully requests that this Court remove Record No. 49 from the 
record during this appeal and return Record No. 49 to the City should the Court affirm 
the lower court's ruling. 
Moreover, with respect to Record No. 49, the City is required to be vague in its statement 
of facts regarding said record inasmuch as the minutes of the closed meeting are 
protected records until declared otherwise. Given the nature of this case, the City 
understands that the Court will review the minutes of the closed meeting for itself in light 
of the City's statement of facts and in support of the trial court's ruling. 
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2. The stated reason for the closed meeting was for the purpose of discussing 
pending litigation as per §52-4-5(1 )(a)(iii), Utah Code Annotated. [R. at 49, document 
entitled "South Weber City's Planning Commission Amended Agenda."]. 
3. On January 22, 2004, a sworn statement declaring the purpose of the closed 
meeting to be for a strategy session regarding pending or reasonably imminent litigation 
was signed and entered into the City records. [R. at 49, document entitled "Closed 
Meeting Sworn Statement."]. 
4. On Januray 22, 2004 at 6:05 p.m., a motion to close the meeting in 
accordance with §52-4-5(1 )(a)(iii) Utah Code Annotated, for purposes of discussing 
pending litigation, was made and was unanimously adopted. [R. at 49, document entitled 
"South Weber City's Planning Commission Amended Agenda."]. 
5. The City's attorney was invited to attend the closed meeting and answer 
questions regarding a lawsuit filed by Mr. Brent Poll, the Petitioner in this case, 
challenging the zoning of a subdivision, the approval of which was on the Planning 
Commission's open meeting agenda for that same night, January 22, 2004. [R. at 49, 
document entitled "South Weber Planning Commission Closed Executive Session."]. 
6. During the Planning Commission's closed meeting, the City's attorney was 
asked several questions about the affect of the Petitioner's lawsuit on the approval of the 
subdivision, as well as certain courses of action the Planning Commission might be able 
to take in light of the pending litigation. [R. at 49, document entitled "South Weber 
Planning Commission Closed Executive Session."]. 
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7. At 6:34 p.m., the closed meeting terminated and the Planning Commission 
immediately went to its regularly scheduled and open Planning Commission meeting. [R. 
at 49, document entitled "South Weber Planning Commission Closed Executive 
Session."]. 
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The City notes that its response to Petitioner's Statement of Relevant Facts is 
made difficult by the fact that the Petitioner's statements of fact are not numbered or set 
out in such a way as to invite an ordered response. Nonetheless, the City responds in a 
more categorical fashion by pointing out that most of the statements contained within 
Petitioner's Relevant Facts are completely irrelevant to the issue of whether or not the 
City properly closed the January 22, 2004 Planning Commission meeting. Petitioner 
spends much time making statements regarding certain properties, transactions, past and 
present disputes with the City, the history of certain property conveyances, and the issue 
of condemnation. Petitioner objects to these statements in that they are irrelevant and 
unsupported by admissible evidence in the trial record. 
In the last paragraph of page 6 of Petitioner's Brief, the Petitioner begins to 
discuss the closed meeting. However, in this paragraph he makes statements regarding 
the timing of the closed meeting and the fact that the Planning Commission only had 
approximately thirty (30) minutes in which to call for and hold the closed meeting. 
Although, the City does not object to Petitioner's statement regarding the time at which 
the closed meeting was held, it objects to Petitioner's statement in the carryover portion 
of the last paragraph of page 6 of Petitioner's Brief wherein Petitioner alleges that no one 
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was aware of the closed meeting, that none of them had initiated it, that no planning 
commissioner had ever participated in a closed meeting before, and that only one 
commissioner had a copy of the lawsuit to be discussed at the closed meeting. 
[Petitioner's Brief, last paragraph of pg. 6, first paragraph of pg. 7]. As support, 
Petitioner refers the Court to the Record at 10 and 68. However, these pages of the 
record do not support such statements. The Petitioner's statement contains hearsay which 
was not established or admitted into evidence in any way at the trial court level. 
In the second and third paragraphs of page 7 of Petitioner's brief, Petitioner 
goes on to make statements regarding certain training provided to the City as well as 
statements made in that training, along with an allegation that the City Manager simply 
told the City to ignore the training. [Petitioner's Brief, paragraphs 2 and 3 of pg. 7]. 
These statements consist of hearsay, are completely irrelevant to the issue before this 
Court, and do not refer to any part of the record for support. 
Petitioner's last paragraph of page 7 of its brief is equally unsupported by the 
record and is irrelevant, inasmuch as it deals with issues which took place in the open 
portion of the meeting following the closed meeting, and allegations which were not 
adjudicated or decided by the trial court. [Petitioner's Brief, last paragraph of pg. 7]. 
Then, the third full paragraph of page 8 of Petitioner's Brief, and all paragraphs 
thereafter, goes on to make representations about meetings other than the closed meeting 
at issue in this case. [Petitioner's Brief, paragraph 3 of pg. 8]. The statements are 
irrelevant and have no bearing upon whether the meeting at issue was properly closed for 
the purpose of discussing pending or reasonably imminent litigation. However, the City 
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does not dispute the fact that it follows the advice of its appointed advisors "more often 
than not.'" However, this is still irrelevant to the issue before this Court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A review of the minutes of the Planning Commission's closed meeting of 
January 22, 2004 will reveal that it was appropriately called for the purpose of discussing 
pending or reasonably imminent litigation, and that the Planning Commission asked 
several and varied questions of its attorney in that meeting regarding the affect of 
Petitioner's lawsuit against the City challenging the rezone of the subdivision, the 
approval of which was before the Planning Commission the very same night. Therefore, 
the meeting was properly closed and the minutes thereof are not public documents. 
ARGUMENT 
A, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE CLOSED 
PLANNING COMMISSION MEETING OF JANUARY 22, 2004 WAS 
PROPERLY CLOSED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING PENDING 
OR REASONABLY IMMINENT LITIGATION. 
Planning Commission meetings are open to the public unless closed pursuant to 
§52-4-4 and §52-4-5 of the Utah Code. U.C.A. §52-4-3. However, a meeting may be 
closed on the vote of two-thirds of the members of the Planning Commission present at 
the meeting as to matters set forth in §52-4-5 of the Utah Code. U.C.A. §52-4-4. A 
closed meeting may be held if it constitutes a strategy session to discuss pending or 
reasonably imminent litigation. U.C.A. §52-4-5(1 )(a)(iii). 
In Kearns-Tribune Corporation v. Salt Lake County Commission, 28 P.3d 686, 
the court was asked to determine whether or not the subject of a certain closed meeting 
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was "litigation" as contemplated by §52-4-5(1 )(a)(iii), and whether or not the discussion 
in that closed meeting was a "strategy session" as contemplated by this same section. Id. 
The issue in the Kearns-Tribune case did not involve actual or formal litigation 
as it does in the instant case, rather it involved a neighboring city's petition before Salt 
Lake County's Boundary Commission. Id. at 689, ^[11. This is not an issue in the instant 
case. The Kearns- Tribune court held that even though the issues did not involve formal 
"litigation" which implied court proceedings, the issues before the Boundary 
Commission were, nonetheless, "litigation" as contemplated by the exception to the open 
meeting rule. Id. at 692, Tf27, 30. The "litigation" in the instant case consists of the 
lawsuit filed by the Petitioner against the City. [Poll Enterprises v. City of South Weber, 
et al., Civ. No. 030700162, 2d Dist. Davis County]. The litigation's impact on the 
Planning Commission's course or strategy was the subject of the closed meeting. 
The Kearns-Tribune court then went on to analyze whether the closed portion 
of Salt Lake County's meeting was a strategy session. Id. at 690 fl7. In answering this 
question, the Court reasoned that "[i]n generally accepted terms, to strategize means to 
devise plans or means to achieve an end." Id. at 690 TJ18. In that the attorney for the 
County Commission explained to the Commission in the closed meeting the factual and 
procedural circumstances leading to the neighboring city's annexation petition. Id. The 
attorney then informed the County Commission regarding the status of the neighboring 
city's petition and offered possible courses of action or scenarios the Commission might 
adopt. Id. Then, the attorney counseled the Commission not to pursue a certain option 
presented in the closed meeting. Id. at 691 ^fl8. 
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In the instant case, the minutes of the closed meeting demonstrate that the 
attorney was invited for the specific purpose of discussing the pending litigation initiated 
by the Petitioner. [R. at 49]. Moreover, it demonstrates that the Planning Commission 
asked specific and pointed questions to the attorney regarding the affect of said litigation 
on the Planning Commission's approval of a certain subdivision, the zoning of which was 
the subject matter of the Petitioner's lawsuit. [R. at 49]. Also, the minutes demonstrate 
that the attorney provided the Planning Commission with certain legal options regarding 
the Commission's duty and made recommendation about each one. [R. at 49]. This 
meeting constituted a strategy session to discuss pending litigation. 
In fact, on page 17 of Petitioner's Brief, the Petitioner acknowledges that 
litigation may have been discussed in some general way in the closed meeting. 
[Petitioner's Brief, pg. 17]. However, it appears from Petitioner's argument that 
Petitioner's real concern is that the attorney told the Planning Commission that it was 
required to vote a certain way on a legislative or policy issue. Even though this issue was 
not adjudicated at the trial court level, it necessitates a response. Meaning, Petitioner is 
concerned that the attorney required the Planning Commission to recommend for 
approval the very subdivision Petition was challenging through his lawsuit, which was 
the subject of the meeting. The minutes of the closed meeting demonstrate that no such 
mandate was ever made by the attorney. [R. at 49]. Moreover, the minutes demonstrate 
that several options were presented to the Planning Commission and that the members of 
the Commission were given options, not mandates. [R. at 49]. 
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Moreover, it is important to note that the issue of whether an attorney tells a 
Planning Commission in a closed meeting that the Commission must vote a certain way 
is irrelevant to whether or not the meeting itself was properly closed and conducted 
pursuant to an exception to the open meeting rule. 
Also, it bears noting that the Planning Commission did not make a legislative 
decision at the closed meeting. Rather, in the open meeting following the closed meeting, 
the Planning Commission, not the attorney, made its decision. While the Planning 
Commission in a meeting several months later may have referred to the attorney's advice 
given in the closed meeting, such a fact should hardly be allowed to condemn a closed 
meeting rendering the minutes thereof public. 
B, THE ISSUES OF JUDICIAL VERSUS LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS, AND 
WHETHER THE CLOSED MEETING WAS FOR 'INFORMATION 
GATHERING' ARE IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF THIS APPEAL, 
Petitioner is unnecessarily preoccupied with the issue of distinguishing between 
the judicial and legislative function of a Planning Commission, and whether the closed 
meeting at issue in this case was for purposes of 'information gathering.' Although, 
again, these issues were not argued or adjudicated at the trial court level, it necessitates a 
response should this Court decide to entertain it. The cases to which Petitioner refers on 
this issue have no application to the issue before this Court. Andrews v. Board of 
Pardons, 836 P.2d 790; Common Cause v. Utah Public Service Commission, 598 P.2d 
1312; and Dairy Product Services v. City of Wellsville, 13 P.3d 581 all deal with the 
issue of determining whether a certain public body should be entirely exempt from the 
open meeting laws if it is determined that such a body carries a judicial rather than a 
l l 
legislative role. For this reason, the city ordinances to which Petitioner refers in his brief 
on pages 11 and 16 are irrelevant to the issue before this Court. [Petitioner's Brief, pg. 
11,16]. 
In the instant case, the City does not contend that the meetings of its Planning 
Commission are not subject to the open meeting laws. Rather, the City contends that the 
closed meeting of January 22, 2004 fits within a statutor) exception to the open meeting 
laws. This is the issue which is before this Court. 
Lastly, Petitioner seems to argue for the first time on appeal that the closed 
meeting was not properly called or notified. The Petitioner makes unsupported 
assumptions that no one with authority called and set the closed meeting, and that even if 
such was the case, that it would be fatal to the meeting itself. Also, Petitioner makes the 
unsupported allegations that the Planning Commission was not experienced enough to 
deny the request for the closed meeting, and that the Planning Commission only had three 
minutes in which to decide whether or not to actually mo\ e in to a closed meeting, and 
that because of all of this, the closed meeting was improperly held. Again, even though 
this issue was not adjudicated at the trial court level, the City wishes to respond. 
First, these allegations are not supported by the record or any admissible 
evidence therein. Second, whether the closed meeting was called by any one with 
"authority" is no consequence under the facts of this case. The Planning Commission 
had an opportunity to either move into a closed session or not, and, in this case, it 
unanimously approved a member's motion to move into a closed meeting. 
12 
Third, whether a Planning Commission takes three minutes or thirty minutes in 
which to decide whether to move into a closed meeting says nothing about the propriety 
of that meeting. If a Planning Commission member believed that for some reason he or 
she was duped into moving for and approving the closed meeting, then that member had 
the right to move to stop the closed meeting and move into an open meeting. 
Lastly, there is no evidence that any Planning Commission member felt duped, 
hurried, unaware, or even hesitant about entering into a closed meeting, nor about staying 
in that meeting until it was terminated. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the lower court's decision declaring that the January 
22, 2004 meeting was properly closed to the public, and that the minutes thereof are 
protected records as a result. 
DATED this / y day of January, 2005. 
SMITH£MQWLES, p.c. 
StepnSrrfrlNoel 
Attorney for the City, City of South Weber 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this I J day of January, 2005,1 caused to be mailed 
first class, U.S. Mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, 
postage prepaid, to: 
Brent Poll 
7605 S. 1375 E. 
South Weber, Utah 84405 
Stephen Noel, Attorney for Appellant/City 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Section 52-4-2 Page 1 of 1 
52-4-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Convening" means the calling of a meeting of a public body by a person authorized to do so for 
the express purpose of discussing or acting upon a subject over which that public body has jurisdiction. 
(2) (a) "Meeting" means the convening of a public body, with a quorum present, whether in person or 
by means of electronic equipment, for the purpose of discussing or acting upon a matter over which the 
public body has jurisdiction or advisory power. 
(b) "Meeting" does not mean: 
(i) a chance meeting; or 
(ii) the convening of a public body that has both legislative and executive responsibilities where no 
public funds are appropriated for expenditure during the time the public body is convened and: 
(A) the public body is convened solely for the discussion or implementation of administrative or 
operational matters for which no formal action by the public body is required; or 
(B) the public body is convened solely for the discussion or implementation of administrative or 
operational matters that would not come before the public body for discussion or action. 
(3) (a) "Public body" means any administrative, advisory, executive, or legislative body of the state 
or its political subdivisions that: 
(i) consists of two or more persons; 
(ii) expends, disburses, or is supported in whole or in part by tax revenue; and 
(iii) is vested with the authority to make decisions regarding the public's business. 
(b) "Public body" does not include any: 
(i) political party, group, or caucus; nor 
(ii) any conference committee, rules committee, or sifting committee of the Legislature. 
(4) (a) "Quorum" means a simple majority of the membership of a public body, unless otherwise 
defined by applicable law. 
(b) "Quorum" does not include a meeting of two elected officials by themselves when no action, 
either formal or informal, is taken on a subject over which these elected officials have jurisdiction. 
Amended by Chapter 89, 1994 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 52_04003.ZIP 2,652 Bytes 
Sections in this ChaptcijChaptcrs in this Titlc|All Titles|Legislative Home Page 
Last revised: Thursday, April 29, 2004 
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Utah Code Section 52-4-3 Page 1 of 1 
52-4-3. Meetings open to the public — Exceptions. 
Every meeting is open to the public unless closed pursuant to Sections 52-4-4 and 52-4-5. 
Enacted by Chapter 180, 1977 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 52_04004.ZIP 1,641 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter]Chapters in this Title] All TitleslLegislative Home Page 
Last revised: Thursday, April 29, 2004 
http://www.le.state.ut.us/~code/TITLE52/htm/52 04004.htm 1/1 AH AfK 
Utah Code Section 52-4-4 Page 
I losed meeting held upon vote of members - Business — Reasons for meeting 
j. v viv.^v, meeting may be held upon the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the public 
body present at an open meeting for which notice is given pursuant to Section 52-4-6; provided, a 
quorum is present. No closed meeting is allowed except as to matters exempted under Section 52-4-5; 
provided, no ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, contract, or appointment shall be approved at a 
closed meeting. The reason or reasons for holding a closed meeting and the vote, either for or against the 
proposition to hold such a meeting, cast by each member by name shall be entered on the minutes of the 
meeting. 
Nothing in this cliaplci shall hr omsfitial lo icqnm' ,III\ ninlinj1" to be dosed to the public _ 
Enacted by Chapter 180, 1977 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 52_04005.ZIP 2.1 uo liytes 
Sections in this Chapter|Chapters in this Title|All Titles|Legislative Home Page 
nl », 2004 
Utah Code Section 52-4-5 Page 1 of 1 
52-4-5. Purposes of closed meetings — Chance meetings and social meetings excluded — 
Disruption of meetings. 
(1) (a) A closed meeting may be held pursuant to Section 52-4-4 for any of the following purposes: 
(i) discussion of the character, professional competence, or physical or mental health of an 
individual; 
(ii) strategy sessions to discuss collective bargaining; 
(iii) strategy sessions to discuss pending or reasonably imminent litigation; 
(iv) strategy sessions to discuss the purchase, exchange, or lease of real property when public 
discussion of the transaction would disclose the appraisal or estimated value of the property under 
consideration or prevent the public body from completing the transaction on the best possible terms; 
(v) strategy sessions to discuss the sale of real property when: 
(A) public discussion of the transaction would disclose the appraisal or estimated value of the 
property under consideration or prevent the public body from completing the transaction on the best 
possible terms; 
(B) the public body had previously given public notice that the property would be offered for sale; 
and 
(C) the terms of the sale are publicly disclosed before the public body approves the sale; 
(vi) discussion regarding deployment of security personnel, devices, or systems; 
(vii) investigative proceedings regarding allegations of criminal misconduct; and 
(viii) discussion by a county legislative body of commercial information as defined in Section 59-1-
404. 
(b) A public body may not interview a person applying to fill an elected position in a closed meeting. 
(c) Nothing in this section may be construed to require any public body to approve the purchase, sale, 
exchange, or lease of real property if that public body is not required to approve the purchase, sale, 
exchange, or lease of real property under other laws. 
(2) This chapter shall not apply to any chance meeting or a social meeting. No chance meeting or 
social meeting shall be used to circumvent this chapter. 
(3) This chapter shall not prohibit the removal of any person who willfully disrupts a meeting to the 
extent that orderly conduct is seriously compromised. 
Amended by Chapter 294, 2004 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 52_04006.ZIP 3,024 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter!Chapters in this Title) All TitleslLegislative Home Page 
Last revised: Thursday, April 29, 2004 
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Utah Code Section 52-4-6 Page 1 of 1 
52-4-6. Public notice of meetings. 
(1) Any public body which holds regular meetings that are scheduled in advance over the course of a 
year shall give public notice at least once each year of its annual meeting schedule as provided in this 
section. The public notice shall specify the date, time, and place of such meetings. 
(2) In addition to the notice requirements of Subsection (1) of this section, each public body shall 
give not less than 24 hours' public notice of the agenda, date, time and place of each of its meetings. 
(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by: 
(a) posting written notice at the principal office of the public body, or if no such office exists, at the 
building where the meeting is to be held; and 
(b) providing notice to at least one newspaper of general circulation within the geographic 
jurisdiction of the public body, or to a local media correspondent. 
(4) Public bodies are encouraged to develop and use electronic means to post notice in addition to 
those means listed in Subsection (3). 
(5) When because of unforeseen circumstances it is necessary for a public body to hold an emergency 
meeting to consider matters of an emergency or urgent nature, the notice requirements of Subsection (2) 
may be disregarded and the best notice practicable given. No such emergency meeting of a public body 
shall be held unless an attempt has been made to notify all of its members and a majority votes in the 
affirmative to hold the meeting. 
Amended by Chapter 110, 1998 General Session 
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52-4-7.5. Record of closed meetings. 
(1) If a public body closes a meeting to discuss the character, professional competence, or physical or 
mental health of an individual under Subsection 52-4-5(1 )(a)(i) or to discuss the deployment of security 
personnel, devices, or systems under Subsection 52-4-5(1 )(a)(vi)„ the person presiding shall sign a 
sworn statement affirming that the sole purpose for closing the meeting was to discuss: 
(a) the character, professional competence, or physical or mental health of an individual; or 
(b) the deployment of security personnel, devices, or systems. 
(2) (a) If a public body closes a meeting under Subsection 52-4-5(1) for any purpose other than to 
discuss the character, professional competence, or physical or mental health of an individual or to 
discuss the deployment of security personnel, devices, or systems, the public body shall either tape 
record the closed portion of the meeting or keep detailed written minutes that disclose the content of the 
closed portion of the meeting. 
(b) (i) Tape recordings and written minutes of closed meetings are protected records under Title 63, 
Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act, and any person who violates the 
provisions of Section 63-2-801 is subject to the criminal penalties contained in that section. 
(ii) Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection 63-2-202(4)(c), tape recordings and written 
minutes of closed meetings, as protected records, may be disclosed pursuant to a court order only as 
provided in Section 52-4-10. 
Enacted by Chapter 89, 1994 General Session 
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Utah Code Section 52-4-10 Page 1 of 1 
52-4-10. Action challenging closed meeting. 
(1) Notwithstanding the procedure established in Subsection 63-2-202(7), in any action brought 
under the authority of this chapter to challenge the legality of a closed meeting held by a public body, 
the court shall: 
(a) review the tape recording or written minutes of the closed meeting in camera; and 
(b) decide the legality of the closed meeting. 
(2) (a) If the judge determines that the public body did not violate the law governing closed meetings, 
the judge shall dismiss the case without disclosing or revealing any information from the tape recording 
or minutes of the closed meeting. 
(b) If the judge determines that the public body violated the law governing closed meetings, the judge 
shall publicly disclose or reveal from the tape recordings or minutes of the closed meeting all 
information about the portion of the meeting that was illegally closed. 
Enacted by Chapter 89, 1994 General Session 
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